Louisiana Law Review
Volume 81
Number 2 Winter 2021

Article 11

3-22-2021

Strangers in a Strange Land: Problems with the Recent Influx of
ICE Detainees into Louisiana, and What to Do about It
Danielle Grote

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Immigration Law Commons

Repository Citation
Danielle Grote, Strangers in a Strange Land: Problems with the Recent Influx of ICE Detainees into
Louisiana, and What to Do about It, 81 La. L. Rev. (2021)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol81/iss2/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Strangers in a Strange Land: Problems with the
Recent Influx of ICE Detainees into Louisiana, and
What to Do about It
Danielle Grote
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 548
I.

U.S. Detention of Noncitizens Over Time ................................... 552
A. The Chinese Exclusion Era:
“Vast Hordes Crowding Upon Us”........................................ 553
B. Early Detention of Noncitizens.............................................. 554
C. The Paradigm Shift in Noncitizen Detention......................... 555
D. “Crimmigration” and the Deterrence and
Punishment Rationales........................................................... 558

II.

Federal Immigration Policy’s Due Process Deficit ...................... 559
A. The Substantive Due Process Deficit..................................... 561
B. The Procedural Due Process Deficit...................................... 562
C. The Jennings Court’s Missed Opportunity............................ 563
D. A Distinction Without a Difference....................................... 564
E. Louisiana’s Role Reconsidered ............................................. 565

III. Immigration Federalism and Rethinking
Louisiana’s Role........................................................................... 566
A. Modern Conceptions of Federalism....................................... 566
B. Immigration Federalism 3.0................................................... 568
C. Federalism and Political Subdivisions................................... 570
D. The Case for Uncooperative Federalism in Louisiana........... 571

Copyright 2021, by DANIELLE GROTE.
 J.D. candidate 2021, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. This Comment is dedicated to my husband, Isaac, who inspires me to
be better, my daughters, Ruth and Eleanor, who inspire me to make the world
better, and my mentor, the late Congressman Elijah E. Cummings, who reminded
us all that “we are better than this.” I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude
to the student editors and faculty advisors of the Louisiana Law Review for their
work to bring this Comment to fruition, and especially to Professor Darlene
Goring, whose tremendously valuable insight, guidance, and support made this
Comment possible.

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 157

2/5/21 12:55 PM

548

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

1. Noncitizen Detention Undermines the
State’s Criminal Justice Reform Efforts.......................... 572
2. ICE Detention Is Not a Sustainable
Economic Plan ................................................................ 572
3. Human Rights Concerns.................................................. 573
IV. A Necessary Solution: Give the Power
to Contract to the State ................................................................. 575
A. Legislative Proposal............................................................... 576
B. Policy Objectives ................................................................... 576
C. Expected Results.................................................................... 577
Conclusion.................................................................................... 579
INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 2019, 43-year-old Cuban asylum-seeker Roylan
Hernández Diáz died of an apparent suicide while being held in solitary
confinement by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the
Richwood Correctional Center in Monroe.1 Authorities separated him
from the general prison population when he threatened to go on a hunger
strike to protest abuse he suffered in detention and the government’s
multiple rejections of his requests to be released on bond pending a
decision on his asylum application.2 Mr. Hernández Diáz’s case is one of
several alarming stories of noncitizen detention in Louisiana that reporters
recently uncovered.3 In March 2019, a total of 2,287 detainees in two ICE
detention facilities in Louisiana had to be quarantined because of potential
exposure to mumps.4 Detainees protested the harsh conditions through
1. Teo Armus, A Cuban Immigrant asked for asylum. After months of
detention, he killed himself, ICE says, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2019, 6:28
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/17/cuban-immigrant-ask
ed-asylum-detention-killed-himself-ice/ [https://perma.cc/47R2-RBZT].
2. Hamed Aleaziz & Adolfo Flores, A Cuban Asylum-Seeker Died of an
Apparent Suicide After Spending Months in ICE Detention, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Oct. 16, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz
/cuban-asylum-ice-death-suicide-louisiana-detention [https://perma.cc/G85E-JC
4U].
3. Maria Clark, Mumps quarantine at Louisiana immigration detention
centers affecting legal access, lawyers say, NOLA.COM (Mar. 13, 2019, 10:49
PM), https://www.nola.com/news/article_c7b600fd-bce5-53a5-86c7-2b15a461e
7f9.html [https://perma.cc/R6AP-4YXQ].
4. Id.
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hunger strikes and other methods—and authorities responded by pepper
spraying more than 100 people involved in the protest.5 Then the
coronavirus pandemic took hold, leading to a nationwide shutdown and
making conditions for a vulnerable population of immigrants who were
detained in close quarters even worse.6 In the Spring of 2020, immigrants
in detention and ICE officers at detention facilities were reporting
symptoms consistent with the coronavirus infection, though the actual
number of infections is unknown because widespread testing was
unavailable at the time.7 In remote areas of Louisiana, the problem was
exacerbated by poor access to health care.8 Many of the symptomatic
detainees were deported to their countries of origin, which contributed to
the virus’ global spread.9
Immigrant rights activists have called on Louisiana ICE detention
facilities to take additional steps to ensure the safety of those in their
custody, noting the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers who come
to the United States because they feel unsafe in their home countries.10 The
United Nations High Commission for Refugees discourages countries
from detaining asylum seekers, citing their vulnerability due to past trauma
and the negative impact that detention can have on them.11 The federal
government justifies such detention as necessary to deter people from

5. Fernanda Echavarri, Dozens of ICE Detainees Were Pepper-Sprayed by
Guards for Protesting at a Louisiana Jail, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/08/immigrant-detention-ice-bossierlouisiana-pepper-spray/ [https://perma.cc/R8ZP-UURW].
6. Jorge Loweree, Aaron Reichlin-Melnick & Walter Ewing, The Impact of
COVID-19 on Noncitizens and Across the U.S. Immigration System, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/re
search/impact-covid-19-us-immigration-system [https://perma.cc/CU3Y-KCTJ].
7. Id.
8. Kristina Cooke, Mica Rosenberg & Ryan McNeill, As pandemic rages,
U.S. immigrants detained in areas with few hospitals, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-detention-insi/as-pan
demic-rages-u-s-immigrants-detained-in-areas-with-few-hospitalsidUSKBN21L1E4 [https://perma.cc/AAU5-W2KM].
9. Loweree, Reichlin-Melnick & Ewing, supra note 6.
10. Armus, supra note 1.
11. See generally UNHRC Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and
Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, OFF. UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES GENEVA (Feb. 1999), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us
/protection/globalconsult/3bd036a74/unhcr-revised-guidelines-applicable-criter
ia-standards-relating-detention.html [https://perma.cc/A89G-6HVY].
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coming to the United States without authorization; however, the
deterrence rationale fails to pass constitutional muster.12
Ironically, Louisiana’s current role in ICE detention has its origins in
Governor John Bel Edwards’s comprehensive criminal justice reform
package that was enacted on June 15, 2017, in an effort to lower
Louisiana’s incarceration rate, which was the highest in the country at the
time.13 Indeed, progress has been made toward reducing incarceration in
the state overall—Louisiana’s prison population has decreased by almost
7,500 since 2012, when it was at its peak.14 Over the past year, however,
ICE has filled those newly empty beds with detainees, nearly doubling ICE
detention capacity in Louisiana through contracts with local parishes.15
Louisiana is now second behind Texas in the number of ICE detainees
housed in the state, with a population of more than 8,000 people detained
in local prisons.16 This scheme thrusts Louisiana into the center of a
national debate involving the detention of noncitizens, raising questions
about whether ICE detention practices are unconstitutional on due process
grounds and, if so, whether states should refuse to participate in such a
system.17
Louisiana should reassess and reject its current role in detaining
noncitizens.18 Because ICE contracts directly with local parishes without
input from the state, this arrangement denies Louisiana citizens and their
12. See infra Part II.
13. Clark, supra note 3; see Criminal Justice Reform, OFF. OF THE
GOVERNOR, http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/58 [https://perma.cc/3EBZ9BPK].
14. Louisiana imprisonment went from 39,867 individuals in 2012 to 32,397
in 2018. LA. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. & LA. COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T,
LOUISIANA’S JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REFORMS 2019 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
REPORT
(2019),
https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/CJR/
2019-JRIPerformance-Annual-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5R8-LMXX].
15. Clark, supra note 3. ICE obtains the majority of its detention capacity
through agreements with state and local governments called “intergovernmental
service agreements.” Some of those localities then subcontract with private
contractors. See Lora Adams, State and Local Governments Opt Out of Immigrant
Detention, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 25, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/07/25/472535/statelocal-governments-opt-immigrant-detention/ [https://perma.cc/9TNU-PE38].
16. Nomaan Merchant, Louisiana becomes new hub in immigrant detention
under Trump, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 9, 2019), https://apnews.com/article
/c72d49a100224cb5854ec8baea095044 [https://perma.cc/F7TS-EHZT] (citing
statistic of 8,000 detainees in Louisiana).
17. Clark, supra note 3.
18. See infra Part III.D.
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representatives the opportunity to consider whether it is appropriate. This
Comment argues that Louisiana should reject its current role in ICE
detention based on public policy concerns and because ICE detention
practices are unconstitutional on substantive and procedural due process
grounds.19 The substantive due process inquiry turns on whether the
government’s interest in detaining noncitizens is warranted and, if so,
whether that interest justifies the means of detention that the government
employs.20 The procedural due process question asks whether the
government’s detention policy violates noncitizens’ liberty interests.21
Legal scholars who have examined the constitutionality of current ICE
detention practices find that it fails under both analyses.22 Originally,
detention of noncitizens consisted of a strictly administrative system used
to hold noncitizens arriving at ports of entry like Ellis Island or Angel
Island for brief periods of time while awaiting assessment for admissibility
into the United States on health and safety grounds.23 This system has
morphed into widespread, prolonged detention of tens of thousands of
people nationwide in prison-like conditions for months or even years.24
The recent surge of ICE detainees into Louisiana is supporting this
system—and the state’s citizens and their elected officials should reassess
Louisiana’s role in that system.25 Louisiana has gone from having the
highest rate of incarcerated people overall to having the second largest
population of ICE detainees, thereby replacing one undesirable distinction
for another.26
The federal government has primary authority over immigration law;
however, states are increasingly taking on a more active role.27 States have
19. See infra Part III.D.
20. Aaron Korthuis, Detention and Deterrence: Insights from the Early Years
of Immigration Detention at the Border, 129 YALE L. J. F. 238, 254–55 (2019).
21. Id.
22. Id.; see Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and
the Persistence of Plenary Power, 28 BERKLEY LA RAZA L. J. 118 (2018); Travis
Silva, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 227 (2012).
23. Though not the subject of this Comment, it is worth noting that conditions
at Ellis Island, which processed predominantly European noncitizens, were
superior to conditions at Angel Island, which processed predominantly Asian
noncitizens. Prolonged detention did occur but was atypical. Korthuis, supra note
20, at 250–51.
24. Id.
25. Merchant, supra note 16.
26. Id.
27. Rick Su, Notes on the Multiple Facets of Immigration Federalism, 15
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 183 (2008).
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asserted their own agendas on immigration policy by enacting legislation,
cooperating with the federal government when they agree with it, and
refusing to cooperate when they disagree.28 For example, states interested
in increasing their involvement in immigration enforcement have found
opportunity to do so by entering into cooperative agreements between
local law enforcement and the federal government.29 On the other end of
the spectrum, states that oppose the federal government’s immigration
policies have refused to implement them by establishing sanctuary cities.30
This framework provides a model for Louisiana’s response to the recent
influx of ICE detainees into the state.31 The decision to detain noncitizens
in Louisiana is a policy one that should be made at the state level, not on
an ad hoc basis through contracts between the federal government and
local parishes.32 Therefore, Louisiana should enact legislation to prevent
local parishes from contracting directly with ICE to detain noncitizens in
the future.33
Part I of this Comment presents a brief history of detention of
noncitizens in the United States, from the origins of U.S. immigration
policy to its modern framework. Next, Part II discusses the constitutional
due process issues raised by current federal immigration policy. Part III
then argues that housing ICE detainees in Louisiana is contrary to public
policy and that Louisiana should therefore oppose it on federalism
grounds. Finally, Part IV offers a legislative proposal, modeled on
legislation from California, that would prevent local Louisiana parishes
from contracting directly with the federal government to house ICE
detainees without the state’s express approval. This proposal would
empower the state government to oversee ICE detention practices
statewide and to ensure their compliance with noncitizens’ due process
rights.
I. U.S. DETENTION OF NONCITIZENS OVER TIME
Article I, § 8, clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
authority to establish a “uniform rule of naturalization”; however,
Congress did not exercise this authority for much of the country’s early

28. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695 (2017).
29. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The
President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101 (2016).
30. Id.
31. See infra Part III.D.
32. Merchant, supra note 16.
33. See infra Part III.D.
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history.34 Congress first established a federal immigration policy in the
mid-19th century, responding to political pressure to exclude large
numbers of Chinese immigrants moving to California at that time.35 The
U.S. first welcomed the presence of Chinese migrants through the
Burlingame Treaty of 1868, which invited Chinese laborers to the United
States to build the Transcontinental Railroad.36 California—motivated by
anti-Chinese public opinion—pushed back against this national policy by
enacting legislation that allowed a state immigration commissioner to have
discretion over admissions decisions at state ports.37 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, overturned California’s legislation in Chy Lung v.
Freeman, finding that the state acted beyond its police power authority.38
A. The Chinese Exclusion Era: “Vast Hordes Crowding Upon Us”39
Eight years later, Congress yielded to state pressure to exclude
Chinese laborers from the country when it enacted the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882.40 The Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the
Chinese Exclusion Act in Chae Chan Ping v. United States.41 Chae Chan
Ping was a Chinese laborer who received U.S. residency under the
Burlingame Treaty.42 He then left the United States for a long-term visit
to China, but when he attempted to return to the United States after the
34. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4; Korthuis, supra note 20, at 244.
35. Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29, at 119.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 121; see Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)
(finding that race is a legitimate basis on which to exclude people from the
country).
38. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). Chy Lung was a Chinese passenger aboard a ship
docked in San Francisco Bay who, along with 20 other women aboard the ship,
was detained because a state immigration official deemed her to be a “lewd and
debauched” woman. Chy Lung challenged the constitutionality of the state
immigration law, arguing that it was beyond the state’s authority to enact such
legislation, and the Supreme Court agreed. Id.
39. This subheading is adopted from language in the Chae Chan Ping
decision used to describe Chinese laborers. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581.
40. The majority of anti-Chinese sentiments came from California, where
most Chinese laborers entered the country and settled; however, U.S. labor
interests more widely opposed their presence. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
effectively overturned the Burlingame Treaty, barring immigration of Chinese
laborers for 10 years after its enactment. See The Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L.
No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
41. See generally Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581.
42. Id.
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Chinese Exclusion Act’s enactment, government officials turned him
away.43 The Court upheld the Act, finding that congressional authority to
exclude noncitizens is not susceptible to challenge.44 The Court’s opinion
established the plenary power doctrine, which recognizes both the federal
government’s exclusive control over immigration policy as an exercise of
national sovereignty and the particular authority of Congress to establish
immigration policy under the U.S. Constitution.45 This judicially created
doctrine has largely guided immigration decisions ever since.46
B. Early Detention of Noncitizens
Early federal immigration policy contemplated detention of
noncitizens; however, the purpose and methods of such detention were
much different than those employed today.47 Customs officials initially
used detention as a tool to hold noncitizens for a brief period—days or
weeks, but rarely longer—to assess the person’s admissibility.48 Under the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, officials first used the hull of a ship
docked in San Francisco’s harbor to detain for further processing Chinese
arrivals whom they believed to be inadmissible.49 When that practice
became untenable because of overcrowded and poor conditions, the
federal government built Angel Island.50 The limited purpose of detention
at Angel Island was to process people whose immigration status could not
be immediately ascertained and to screen out people who were sick or
otherwise dangerous.51 In 1896 in Wong Wing v. United States, the
Supreme Court made clear that admissibility was a legitimate rationale for
detention, distinguishing it from the punishment rationale behind

43. Id.
44. The Court stated: “Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an
incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence.” Id. at 603.
45. Id.
46. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 144.
47. Korthuis, supra note 20.
48. Id. at 245; see Robert Barde & Gustavo J. Bobonis, Detention at Angel
Island: First Empirical Evidence, 30 SOC. SCI. HIST. 103, 113 (2006) (finding that
detention periods at Angel Island were brief, lasting 10.2 nights on average); see
also ERIKA LEE & JUDY YUNG, ANGEL ISLAND: IMMIGRANT GATEWAY TO
AMERICA 70, 78 (2012) (finding that detention of mostly European immigrants at
Ellis Island lasted hours or, at most, days).
49. Korthuis, supra note 20, at 247.
50. Id. at 248.
51. These assessments were often made on the basis of race. Id. at 249.
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constitutionally impermissible imprisonment and forced hard labor
imposed on Chinese immigrants unlawfully present in the country.52
For most of the 20th century, detention of noncitizens persisted in
much the same fashion—for brief periods of time and for the express
purpose of determining eligibility for admission.53 In 1954, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the precursor agency to
ICE, abandoned its policy of detaining immigrants in all but rare cases
where a noncitizen was considered a flight risk or a danger to the nation
or community.54 In 1980, INS detained only 4,062 people.55 By contrast,
today ICE detains more than 10 times that amount—approximately 51,000
people nationally.56 The reason for this increase is twofold: Congress
amended immigration laws in the 1980s and 1990s to expand the
categories of noncitizens subject to detention, and in response to increased
levels of migration in recent years, the Obama and Trump administrations
have pursued policy objectives resulting in detention of greater numbers
of noncitizens for longer periods of time.57 Thus, in recent decades, U.S.
immigration-related detention policy has strayed from its historic roots as
a purely administrative function designed to facilitate admissibility
decisions.58
C. The Paradigm Shift in Noncitizen Detention
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which broadened the categories
of noncitizens whom the government must detain, while also providing the
government with broad discretionary authority to detain noncitizens in
52. See generally Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
53. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1457, 1466 (2013).
54. INS was the lead federal agency in charge of immigration policy and
operations until 2003 when it was abolished and its functions transferred to three
separate agencies within the Department of Homeland Security: ICE, Customs
and Border Security (CBP), and United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS). See also Hernández, supra note 53, at 1466 (citing MARK
DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 6–8 (2004)).
55. Id.
56. Merchant, supra note 16.
57. Id.
58. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20; see also Hernández, supra note
53; Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 859 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that in 2015, 7,500 asylum seekers and 12,220 noncitizens who finished
serving sentences of criminal confinement were detained for more than six
months).
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other cases.59 The underlying law that the IIRIRA amended, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), grants the U.S. Attorney General
authority to detain certain noncitizens in immigration proceedings.60
Specifically, it provides for detention of three categories of noncitizens:
(1) people who have finished serving a sentence for a crime and who are
awaiting a decision on whether they will be deported; (2) people who are
in the process of challenging the government’s decision to deport them;
and (3) asylum seekers who are awaiting a decision on their asylum
application.61 Noncitizens in all three categories have the opportunity to
request a bond hearing before an immigration judge.62 Specifically, with
respect to asylum seekers, the INA requires that the government detain the
applicant pending a “credible fear” interview.63 In the “credible fear”
interview, which typically takes place soon after immigration officials
bring asylum seekers into custody, immigration officials determine
whether applicants meet the statutory definition of having a credible fear
of persecution in their home country.64 If applicants fail to establish a
credible fear, then they are subject to immediate removal from the
country.65 If applicants meet the criteria to establish credible fear, they are
then eligible to appear before an immigration judge who makes a final
determination as to whether they are eligible for asylum.66
While noncitizens await the immigration judge’s final determination
on their admissibility into the United States, immigration officials have
discretion to release the noncitizen on parole or bond.67 Recent federal
government policies trend toward the denial of parole or bond to most
asylum seekers who have established credible fear, and immigration
judges have consistently refused noncitizens’ requests for bond
redetermination—leading to detention of noncitizens for months or even

59. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). While the INA requires that
noncitizens are detained in certain circumstances, such as when they are suspected
of terrorism, in other circumstances it affords discretionary authority to
immigration officials to determine whether detainees may be released on parole
or bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
60. Id. § 1226(a).
61. See id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1226(c), 1226(a).
62. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(e), 1103.23(6) (2020).
63. See 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
64. See id.
65. See id. §1226(a).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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years.68 Federal courts, which have appellate review over certain
immigration court matters, have issued opinions deeming these practices
unconstitutional.69 For example, an April 2019 decision by U.S. Attorney
General William Barr, who has authority over all immigration courts,
would have eliminated bond hearings for certain classes of detained
noncitizens altogether.70 In July 2019, a U.S. District Court judge in
Washington state issued a controlling, contrary opinion that requires the
government to continue holding bond hearings for all noncitizens in
detention, thus halting application of the Attorney General’s decision to
future cases.71 In a Louisiana-based case on appeal, a D.C. Circuit Court
judge threatened the federal government with contempt of court for failing
to heed his order that immigration field offices in New Orleans must
consider detained asylum seekers’ requests for parole on a case-by-case
basis.72 The order came in response to a lawsuit filed by detained
noncitizens who provided evidence that the New Orleans office had a
policy of denying parole to all noncitizens in its custody, regardless of their
eligibility.73 Absent an opinion from the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of ICE’s prolonged detention practices, noncitizens
continue to litigate the question in the lower courts in a piecemeal
fashion.74 As a result, the number of detained noncitizens in the United
States has grown to historically high levels of tens of thousands of
people.75
68. See generally Dora Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview and
Recommendations, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2009), https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BXQ-PLW 4].
69. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, federal circuit courts of appeal have limited
judicial review in immigration cases over questions of constitutional or federal
law. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on December 9, 2019, in the
consolidated cases of Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr and Ovalles v. Barr, 139 S. Ct.
2766 (2019), in which it will determine whether circuit courts can rule on mixed
questions of fact and law. See also Padilla v. U.S. Imm. & Cust. Enf., 354 F. Supp.
3d 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2018); Order of U.S. District Court Judge James E.
Boasberg, Mons v. McAllenan, No. 1:19-cv-01593-JEB (Sept. 5, 2019).
70. See Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019).
71. The district judge’s ruling requires that all immigration courts continue
to provide bail hearings to any individual who entered the United States without
inspection, established a credible fear of persecution or torture, and is now in
expedited removal proceedings. See Padilla, No. 354 F. Supp. 3d 1218.
72. See Order of U.S. District Court Judge James E. Boasberg, Mons v.
McAllenan, No. 1:19-cv-01593-JEB (Sept. 5, 2019).
73. Id.
74. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
75. Id.; see also Hernández, supra note 53.
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D. “Crimmigration” and the Deterrence and Punishment Rationales
The reasons for this shift to high rates of noncitizen detention are
complex, reflecting in large part the changing role of criminal law in
society and the increased migration of people coming from the Northern
Triangle countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.76 Following
the civil rights movement and the subsequent stigmatization of overt
racism, policymakers began turning to facially neutral criminal laws to
institute racist policies that were previously overt.77 This trend bled into
immigration policy—where noncitizens of color have historically received
harsher penalties than their white counterparts—and led to the melding of
criminal law and immigration law, or “crimmigration” law.78 Immigration
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a more punitive immigration
system in which the law imposes mandatory removal from the country on
non-citizens convicted of crimes, and punishes immigration-related
offenses through penal systems.79 Faced with a steep rise in the number of
people seeking asylum in the United States from the Northern Triangle
region that began in 2000 and peaked in 2008, the Obama administration
instituted this statutory framework to discourage people from coming to
the United States.80 The Obama administration specifically cited the
objective of deterring noncitizens from coming to the United States as the
rationale for denying bond to asylum seekers awaiting a hearing before an
immigration judge.81 A federal court rejected this deterrence rationale, and
the Trump administration has never tried to reassert it as a legal argument
in court.82 In practice, however, the Trump administration continues to use
76. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
77. Hernández, supra note 53, at 1459. For example, U.S. Sentencing
Commission reports on the sentencing disparity resulting from facially neutral
crack cocaine and powder cocaine mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines
eventually led Congress to enact the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Pub. L. No.
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see also Crack, powder cocaine sentence
guidelines adjusted, BOSTON.COM (Oct. 15, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/
news/nation/washington/articles/2010/10/15/crack_powder_cocaine_sentence_g
uidelines_adjusted/ [https://perma.cc/8WNG-4K3A].
78. Central American and Mexican immigrants make up over 90% of
deportations, yet are only approximately 50% of all immigrants. Rosenbaum,
supra note 22, at 144; see also Hernández, supra note 53, at 1459 (coining the
term “crimmigration”).
79. Hernández, supra note 53, at 1467.
80. Korthuis, supra note 20, at 241–42.
81. Id. at 242.
82. R.I.L-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2015);
Korthuis, supra note 20, at 242.
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detention of noncitizens to deter immigration, as evidenced by the its
rhetoric and policies, such as across-the-board denials of bond and parole,
family separation, and poor conditions at detention facilities.83
The issue is whether these punishment and deterrence rationales are
constitutionally sound reasons for detaining noncitizens at historically
high levels.84 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees claims
that detention of asylum seekers is inherently objectionable.85 The U.N.
cautions that governments should not subject vulnerable asylum seekers
to the negative psychological effects of detention and that countries
receiving asylum seekers should develop alternatives to detention.86 The
constitutional right to due process of law calls into question the legitimacy
of the prolonged detention of even those noncitizens who are not asylum
seekers.
II. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY’S DUE PROCESS DEFICIT87
Given the paradigm shift in immigration law from a purely
administrative function to one inextricably linked to the criminal law
concepts of deterrence and punishment, legal scholars have questioned
whether the current immigration framework can pass constitutional

83. See Makini Brice, Trump says immigrants ‘unhappy’ with detention
centers should stay home, REUTERS (July 3, 2019), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-immigration/trump-says-immigrants-unhappy-with-detention-cen
ters-should-stay-home-idUSKCN1TY1A5
[https://perma.cc/7NYL-NRZX]
(quoting the following Tweet from President Trump: “If Illegal Immigrants are
unhappy with the conditions in the quickly built or refitted detentions centers, just
tell them not to come. All problems solved!”); see also Julia Preston, Detention
Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largestimmigration-detention-center-in-us.html
[https://perma.cc/TT6R-KRNA];
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, NO END IN SIGHT: WHY MIGRANTS GIVE UP
ON THEIR U.S. IMMIGRATION CASES 27, 30, 36 (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/leg_ijp_no_end_in_sight_2018_fina
l_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UZM-VL4X] (describing instances in which
noncitizens did not pursue potential appeals because of prolonged detention).
84. Korthuis, supra note 20, at 242.
85. See UNHRC Revised Guidelines, supra note 11.
86. See id. The United States does employ some alternatives to detention in
the immigration context, including the use of ankle monitors and home detention;
however, those practices are not widespread. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B).
87. This heading is inspired by the title of Carrie Rosenbaum’s article. See
supra note 22.
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muster.88 The Supreme Court has historically applied a different standard
to noncitizens when assessing what constitutional rights, if any, they may
have, because of the plenary powers doctrine.89 As a result, historically the
law has not afforded noncitizens the same protections as criminal
defendants, including due process protections under the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.90 The Court has, however, been willing to diverge
from this path when immigration policy goes beyond its designated
administrative function.91 The Fifth Amendment provides that all persons
are entitled to the due process rights of life, liberty, and property.92 As
criminal law and immigration law become increasingly intertwined and
the U.S. government detains greater numbers of noncitizens for longer
periods of time without opportunity for parole or bond, the current
constitutional framework has proven inadequate.93

88. See generally Hernández, supra note 53; see also Rosenbaum, supra note
22, at 144.
89. Noncitizens appear before immigration judges under the Executive
Office for Immigration Review within the U.S. Department of Justice. They can
appeal to the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, or by
federal courts. See Hernández, supra note 53, at 1466.
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Though beyond the scope of this Comment,
it is worth noting here that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is similarly not
afforded to noncitizens. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that
noncitizens “shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the
Government, by counsel of the [noncitizen’s] choosing who is authorized to
practice in such proceedings.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). In reality, few ever get
such access: 37% of all noncitizens and 14% of detained noncitizens were
represented by counsel in 2016. See Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to
Counsel in Immigration Court, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL SPECIAL
REPORT (Sept. 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/
access-counsel-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/GR9M-2N9D]; see also
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
91. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that civil
detention for punitive purposes would violate the U.S. Constitution); see also
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding that immigration detention
is “temporary harborage”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that
a noncitizen with a final order of removal could not be detained indefinitely
following the ninety-day removal period); Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003)
(holding that mandatory detention is allowable only when it is brief).
92. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93. See generally Hernández, supra note 53; see also Rosenbaum, supra note
22, at 144; Korthuis, supra note 20.
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A. The Substantive Due Process Deficit
The United States’s policy on the detention of noncitizens is
unconstitutional on both substantive and procedural due process
grounds.94 The substantive due process inquiry asks what the
government’s interest is in detaining noncitizens and whether the policy
employed fits that interest.95 To the extent that the government’s objective
in detaining noncitizens is to punish or deter—and all indicators suggest
that it is—that interest is illegitimate.96 The case law is clear that detention
of noncitizens is justified solely for the administrative purpose of
facilitating admissibility decisions.97 As early as 1896, the Supreme Court
in Wong Wing v. U.S. held that detention of noncitizens for punitive
purposes is unconstitutional.98 The Wong Wing decision broke from the
line of cases from the Chinese exclusion era, during which Congress and
the courts consistently denied constitutional protections to Chinese
laborers living in the United States.99 The Court in Wong Wing, held that
detaining noncitizens for the purpose of punishment—specifically,
imprisonment at hard labor—violates their Fifth Amendment liberty
interest.100 The Court’s holding in Wong Wing is still controlling and could
be applied to modern day noncitizens who are facing long-term detention
intended to deter or punish them.101
Like the 19th-century Chinese laborers whom the government
punished with hard labor for no offense other than their desire to live
peacefully in the United States, the U.S. government is punishing modernday noncitizens for trying to immigrate to the United States.102 Under the
Wong Wing standard, the government’s interest in punishing people for
attempting to immigrate to the United States does not pass even the lowest
level of review, rational basis.103 The deterrence and punishment rationales
94. See generally Hernández, supra note 53; see also Rosenbaum, supra note
22, at 144; Korthuis, supra note 20.
95. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
96. Id.
97. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that civil
detention for punitive purposes violates the U.S. Constitution); see also
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding that immigration detention
is “temporary harborage”).
98. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228.
99. See Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29.
100. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228.
101. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
102. See generally id.
103. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228. The highly deferential rational basis
standard requires only that the government action in question be rationally related
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for detaining noncitizens are not legitimate government interests.104
Therefore, subjecting noncitizens to prolonged detention without
opportunity for parole or bond is unconstitutional on substantive due
process grounds.105
B. The Procedural Due Process Deficit
The procedural due process inquiry asks whether the process that the
government employs for detaining noncitizens violates their liberty
interest.106 The Supreme Court has been grappling with this question in
recent decisions.107 In the early 2000s, the Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis
and Denmore v. Kim that prolonged detention without opportunity for
parole or bond in certain circumstances denies noncitizens adequate due
process.108 Although the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on
whether the United States’ current detention policy as a whole violates
noncitizens’ due process rights, all indications suggest that it does.109 The
Court’s decisions in Zadvydas and Denmore were narrow, applying only
to the specific categories of noncitizens who were affected by prolonged
detention in those cases.110 Nonetheless, the holdings suggest that
procedural due process protections could be available to noncitizens more
broadly because the Court acknowledges that noncitizens have such
rights.111 Given the recent surge in long-term detention of noncitizens
without opportunity for parole or bond, legal scholars suggest that the
Court should issue a broader ruling to make clear that current practices
with respect to all categories of noncitizens are unconstitutional on
procedural due process grounds.112
to some legitimate government interest. Legal scholars have argued that courts
should subject current ICE detention practices to strict scrutiny because the
government discriminates on the basis of national origin by disproportionately
subjecting noncitizens from Mexico and Central America to detention. That
analysis is unnecessary, however, because the government’s current practices do
not even pass rational basis review. See generally Rosenbaum, supra note 22.
104. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228.
105. Id.
106. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
107. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); see also Denmore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510 (2003).
108. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678; see also Denmore, 538 U.S. 510.
109. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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C. The Jennings Court’s Missed Opportunity
In 2018, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to decide the
constitutionality of prolonged detention of noncitizens in Jennings v.
Rodriguez, but it neglected to do so.113 The Jennings plaintiffs were a class
of noncitizen detainees who argued that prolonged, indefinite detention
without the opportunity for a bond hearing is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause.114 The Ninth Circuit agreed and relied
on the canon of constitutional avoidance, which allows the courts to
interpret a statute in a constitutionally permissible way when more than
one interpretation is plausible and one of the options is unconstitutional to
avoid a finding that the statute as a whole is unconstitutional.115 Applying
constitutional avoidance, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the statute to dictate
that the Jennings plaintiffs were entitled to a bond hearing within six
months of being detained.116 The Ninth Circuit analogized the case to
Zadvydas, in which a noncitizen’s home country rejected his readmission
after the U.S. government had ordered him removed, leaving him with
nowhere to go and therefore facing indefinite detention in the United
States.117 The Zadvydas Court held that the government may detain a
noncitizen who it has already ordered removed beyond the statute’s 90day removal period, but not beyond a period “reasonably necessary” to
secure removal, presumptively six months.118
The Jennings Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, rejecting its
constitutional avoidance rationale on the basis of statutory interpretation
alone.119 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito distinguished the Jennings
plaintiffs’ claim from Zadvydas because the statutes in question were
different.120 The statute in Zadvydas applies to noncitizens who have
already been ordered removed and states that noncitizens in those
circumstances may be detained.121 By contrast, the statutes in Jennings
apply to noncitizens who are awaiting a final decision on their request to
stay in the United States, and those statutes state that such noncitizens shall
113. See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
114. Id. at 836.
115. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015); Jennings,
138 S. Ct. at 836.
116. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836.
117. Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1074; see generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001).
118. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 834; see generally Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
119. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 835.
120. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231; cf. id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1226(a), 1226(c).
121. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 835; see also id. § 1231.
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be detained.122 Justice Alito’s holding relied solely on statutory analysis—
focusing on the words “may” and “shall”—and failed to address the
Jennings plaintiffs’ due process claims.123
D. A Distinction Without a Difference
In his dissent, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority’s interpretation
in Jennings would likely render the statute unconstitutional.124 Justice
Breyer wrote that the Fifth Amendment applies to noncitizens because it
applies to all persons.125 Further, holding a noncitizen indefinitely without
bond deprives that person of their liberty.126 In fact, without a bond
proceeding, there is no process at all.127 Furthermore, Justice Breyer wrote
that freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
that the Due Process Clause protects, dating back to the Magna Carta from
which it derived.128 Justice Breyer found no reason to treat bond differently
in immigration law than in criminal law:
The strongest basis for reading the Constitution’s bail
requirements as extending to these civil, as well as criminal, cases,
however, lies in the simple fact that the law treats like cases alike.
And reason tells us that the civil confinement at issue here and the
pretrial criminal confinement that calls for bail are in every
relevant sense identical. There is no difference in respect to the
fact of confinement itself.129
Justice Breyer’s dissent raises the possibility that a future iteration of
the Court could find current immigration detention practices
unconstitutional on due process grounds.130 These constitutional
considerations should compel Louisiana to reexamine ICE’s detention
practices in the state.

122. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 835; see also id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1226(a),
1226(c).
123. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 852.
124. Id. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992)).
129. Id. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. See generally id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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E. Louisiana’s Role Reconsidered
A perfect storm of factors makes Louisiana a desirable location for
ICE to house detainees.131 Governor Edwards’ criminal justice reform
package opened up more prison space in Louisiana, which allows ICE to
detain noncitizens at lower cost in Louisiana than in other states.132
Louisiana parishes originally increased their detention capacity because
overcrowding and poor conditions at state prisons pushed the state to
contract with local parishes to house prisoners convicted of criminal
acts.133 When the state government began releasing some of those
prisoners, the parishes lost a reliable revenue stream.134 Those same
parishes turned to ICE contracts to fill the void.135
In addition to the monetary reasons why ICE is moving detainees to
Louisiana, legal scholars have identified a recent practice of ICE known
as “forum shopping,” whereby the agency moves detainees to locations
where ICE is more likely to receive favorable outcomes from local
immigration and circuit court judges.136 Legal scholars cite the Fifth
Circuit in particular as a circuit more favorable to ICE.137 Additionally,
Louisiana has few immigration attorneys available to defend against ICE
cases, and the ones who are in Louisiana live mostly in cities far from the
remote parishes where ICE detainees are held.138 As a result,

131. Merchant, supra note 16.
132. Id.
133. See Lydia Pelot-Hobbs, Louisiana’s Turn to Mass Incarceration: The
Building of a Carceral State, AM. ASS’N OF GEOGRAPHERS (Feb. 1, 2018), http:
//news.aag.org/2018/02/louisianas-turn-to-mass-incarceration-the-building-of-acarceral-state/ [https://perma.cc/UQ8M-PKPL].
134. Id.
135. Merchant, supra note 16.
136. See generally Roger C. Grantham Jr., Detainee Transfers and
Immigration Judges: ICE Forum-Shopping Tactics in Removal Proceedings, 53
GA. L. REV. 281 (2018) (finding that regional differences between immigration
judges allow ICE to forum shop by transferring detainees to detention centers in
the regions where immigration judges who are likely to issue rulings favorable to
ICE).
137. See Adrienne Pon, Identifying Limits to Immigration Detention Transfers
and Venue, 71 STAN. L. REV. 747, 786 (2019) (finding that the law is less
favorable to immigrants in the Fifth Circuit).
138. See Noah Lanard, Inside the Court Room Where Every Asylum Seeker
Gets Rejected, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2019), https://www.motherjones.com
/crime-justice/2019/07/inside-the-courtroom-where-every-asylum-seeker-gets-re
jected/ [https://perma.cc/7EA5-Y3E6]; see also Pon, supra note 137, at 757
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unrepresented noncitizens are less likely to win their cases.139 These
factors suggest that ICE chooses to detain noncitizens in Louisiana
because noncitizens will most likely lose their asylum cases here.140 In the
absence of action from Congress or the Supreme Court, Louisiana has the
opportunity to lead federal actors to adopt a fairer and more equitable
immigration system, consistent with the principles of the U.S.
Constitution.141
III. IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM AND RETHINKING LOUISIANA’S ROLE
Federalism provides a framework for considering what Louisiana’s
role in immigration detention currently is and what it should be.142
Specifically, immigration detention involves interaction between federal,
state, and local actors.143 The federal government determines who it will
detain, for what reasons, and for how long.144 Localities enter into
contracts with ICE to detain noncitizens in Louisiana.145 State government
itself has not had a role in these arrangements; however, given the
constitutional issues discussed above, it should.146 Legal scholarship on
immigration federalism provides some context for considering state
participation in ICE detention policies.147
A. Modern Conceptions of Federalism
Immigration law has historically been the province of the federal
government; however, some jurisprudence has recognized the legitimate
role of states using their police power in immigration law.148 In recent
(2019) (finding that Louisiana is the state receiving the largest number of
transfers, approximately 19% of all transfers).
139. See Lanard, supra note 138; see also Pon, supra note 137.
140. See generally Grantham, supra note 136.
141. Louisiana would join other states that have taken similar action in doing
so. See Adams, supra note 15.
142. See generally Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Merchant, supra note 16.
146. See supra Part II; see also Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29.
147. See generally Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29.
148. See supra Part I.A; see also Su, supra note 27, at 183 (citing Ohio v.
Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392, 394 (1927) (upholding a local ordinance that forbids
noncitizen immigrants from running billiard and pool rooms)); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 223 (1923) (upholding a state law that prevented certain
immigrants from having any interest in land because of the strong state interests
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years, the role of the states has increased to the point at which legal
scholars have carved out a new field of “immigration federalism.”149 This
field situates immigration law in the context of a broader discussion about
the role of federalism in modern society.150 Legal scholars have
historically framed federalism as a tension between “dual sovereigns,” in
which independent federal and state actors compete for power.151 In
reality, state and federal actors are more like codependent equals,
sometimes cooperating, sometimes pushing separate agendas, but never
actually independent.152 This new conception of federalism—“Federalism
3.0”153—posits that federalism is best understood through an examination
of the state implementation of federal policy objectives.154 Under this
framework, the focus shifts from Congress and the courts to administrators
at the state and federal level.155 Scholars of Federalism 3.0 look past
traditional constitutional case law to assess what is actually happening on
the ground.156 Under this framework, states have the power to push their
own policy agendas not only by being cooperative, but also

involved); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420–21 (1948)
(finding state interest insufficient to justify forbidding noncitizen immigrants
from receiving commercial fishing licenses).
149. Su, supra note 27 (citing Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008) (signaling
the federal government’s eagerness to embrace sub-federal activity on the issue));
Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1635–36 (1997). See generally Christina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of
the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (offering a
reformulation of the presumptions of federalism in the context of immigration);
Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 57 (2007) (advocating for a more robust state role in the formation of
immigration policy).
150. Ming H. Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism: Toward a
Doctrinal Framework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1087 (2014).
151. Gerken, supra note 28, at 1698.
152. Id. at 1700.
153. This distinguishes modern federalism from the two major debates over
federal-state relations in the 20th century: the New Deal legacy, or Federalism
1.0, and the Civil Rights Movement, or Federalism 2.0. See id. at 1696.
154. Id. at 1700 (suggesting that federal-state relations look more like the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, with its messy negotiations between
the Obama administration and the states, than the Court’s one-off decision in
National Federation of Independent Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).
155. Id. at 1701.
156. Id. at 1702–04.
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uncooperative.157 This is particularly true of immigration law, where there
is an increasing rate of cooperation between state and federal actors.158
B. Immigration Federalism 3.0
Collaborative efforts between state and federal administrative
agencies have become increasingly important in the immigration
context.159 In the absence of congressional guidance in recent years, the
executive branch has taken on a leadership role in developing federal
immigration policy.160 Likewise, the states have become increasingly
important partners in implementing the executive branch’s agenda.161 This
setup arose for two reasons: (1) the federal government sought to co-opt
state actors in an attempt to prevent the states from taking unilateral action
that could be contrary to federal policy goals, and (2) as a practical matter,
the federal government often needed state resources and cooperation to
implement its policy agenda.162 For example, in response to state efforts to
engage in immigration enforcement, the federal government created the
287(g) grant program.163 The 287(g) program provides federal funding and
training to local law enforcement agencies that in return cooperate with
federal immigration officials by sharing information about people in their
custody.164 The program has the effect of fending off states’ interest in
going rogue by incorporating them into the federal network of immigration
enforcement.165 It also leverages state resources to achieve federal policy
goals.166 Federal and state actors welcome the collaboration to the extent
that their objectives are the same.167 Granted, states have also exploited

157. Id.
158. See generally id.; see also Rodríguez, supra note 149.
159. See generally Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 143.
163. The 287(g) program has been the subject of criticism for reasons that are
beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is worth noting. Specifically, critics note
that it harms relationships between local police and immigrant communities and
deters noncitizens from reporting criminal activity. Id. at 146; see also 8 U.S.C. §
1357(g).
164. Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29, at 147.
165. Id. at 162; see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
(finding that federal law preempted certain sections of an Arizona law that
increased the power of local law enforcement to enforce federal immigration law).
166. Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 29, at 162.
167. Id.
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this codependency by practicing uncooperative federalism when the
federal government seeks to implement policies they oppose.168
Codependency between federal and state administrative agencies is a
catalyst for state resistance to federal policies with which the state
disagrees.169 In the absence of congressional action, states and localities
have taken on the role of questioning the legality or legitimacy of certain
federal actions.170 Further, states and localities have emerged as leaders in
resisting federal action that runs contrary to their citizens’ popular
opinion.171
One example is the local response to paroled and unauthorized
noncitizens from Central America and the Caribbean during the 1970s and
1980s.172 At that time, states and localities pushed back against federal
efforts to deport noncitizens, forcing the federal government to reconsider
its prosecutorial stance, which ultimately led Congress to provide relief
for large groups of unauthorized noncitizens.173 The program was not
applied equally: Cuban noncitizens received different treatment than
Haitian noncitizens, and states passed early versions of sanctuary
ordinances to assure undocumented people that the locality will not
enforce federal immigration laws against them.174 This trend grew in the
1980s, when civil and political unrest in Central America led to an increase
in noncitizens from the Northern Triangle region coming to the United
States.175 In response, state and local jurisdictions enacted sanctuary
ordinances to prevent federal enforcement officials from removing Central
American noncitizens from the United States.176 Congress eventually
conferred legal status on them in response to mounting political
pressure.177 Today, sanctuary cities are again emerging as a means to resist
federal immigration policy that certain state and local governments
oppose.178
168. Id. at 163 (citing Jessica Bullman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009)).
169. Id. at 164.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 166.
172. Id. at 129.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 130.
175. Id. at 131.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 132 (pointing to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and
other relief measures).
178. Specifically, sanctuary cities are refusing to turn noncitizens in their
custody over to ICE officials. New Orleans is one such city. See John Hudak et
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C. Federalism and Political Subdivisions
Although some immigration federalism scholars lump state and local
activity together as if it were a single, cohesive unit, others recognize the
distinct roles of the two.179 Legal scholars emphasize the role of local
government in cooperative arrangements in the immigration context.180
Many of the policies affecting immigrants are local in nature, from
enforcement to integration of immigrant communities into schools,
hospitals, and other institutions.181 Political subdivisions within states
address immigration differently, depending on local politics and policy
priorities.182 Such is the case of noncitizen detainees in Louisiana, where
the federal government contracts directly with local parishes to obtain
prison space.183 The result is that detention of noncitizens in Louisiana has
grown exponentially without the input of the governor or state
lawmakers.184 Thus, the Louisiana legislature should intervene to stop
local parishes from contracting directly with the federal government to
detain noncitizens because ICE detention practices are likely
unconstitutional on due process grounds.185
Other states have grappled with prolonged detention of noncitizens:
lawmakers in California, Michigan, and Illinois enacted legislation to stop
localities from contracting directly with the federal government to detain
noncitizens.186 Louisiana lawmakers can use these states’ reactions as a
model for how to push back against ICE’s unconstitutional practices.187
California Governor Gavin Newsom signed legislation in October 2019
preventing localities from entering into future ICE detention contracts in
order to address human rights concerns and to end what he characterized
as overincarceration of asylum seekers and refugees.188 ICE issued a
al., Trump Threatened Sanctuary Cities and They Shrugged—Here’s Why,
BROOKINGS IMMIGRATION BLOG (May 1, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog
/fixgov/2019/05/01/trump-threatened-sanctuary-cities-and-they-shrugged-hereswhy/ [https://perma.cc/3WKP-M9BQ].
179. See Su, supra note 27; Rodríguez, supra note 149.
180. Rodríguez, supra note 149, at 637.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Merchant, supra note 16.
184. Id.
185. See supra Part II.A. & B.
186. Adams, supra note 15.
187. Id.
188. See Governor Newsom Signs AB 32 to Halt Private, For-Profit Prisons
and Immigration Detention Facilities in California, OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN
NEWSOM (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/10/11/governor-newsom
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statement in response, suggesting that the California legislation will force
the agency to move asylum seekers away from their families and attorneys
in California to places like Louisiana. ICE, however, was already
increasing its detention capacity in Louisiana months before the California
legislation appeared.189 The reality is that even without the loss of
detention space in California—which at the time of the California ban was
approximately 4,000 detainees—ICE needed more detention space
because of its policy of detaining more noncitizens.190
D. The Case for Uncooperative Federalism in Louisiana
Immigration detention presents a major, unanswered legal question:
whether the historic framework in which ICE detainees enjoy fewer
constitutional protections than criminal defendants is justifiable.191 With
the advent of crimmigration in the 1980s and 1990s, and the federal
government’s current practice of using ICE detention for the purposes of
punishment and deterrence, the answer to this question is no.192 The
punishment and deterrence rationales fail to pass constitutional muster on
substantive due process grounds.193 Further, the government’s policy of
issuing across-the-board denials of noncitizens’ requests for bond or
parole raises procedural due process concerns as well.194 Louisiana should
therefore reject ICE’s unconstitutional practices of immigration detention
by practicing uncooperative federalism.195 As a practical matter, ICE
detention in Louisiana is also undesirable for public policy reasons: it
undermines the objectives of the state’s criminal justice reform, presents
economic concerns, and violates human rights.196

-signs-ab-32-to-halt-private-for-profit-prisons-and-immigration-detention-faciliti
es-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/P3DR-WUQZ].
189. See ICE statement on California AB32 restricting immigration detention
facilities in the state, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 11,
2019), https://www.ice.gov/statements/ice-statement-california-ab32-restrictingimmigration-detention-facilities-state [https://perma.cc/4X3L-P3M8]. But see
also Merchant, supra note 16.
190. See ICE statement on California AB32 restricting immigration detention
facilities in the state, supra note 189. But see also Merchant, supra note 16.
191. Korthuis, supra note 20.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Gerken, supra note 28, at 1702–04.
196. Merchant, supra note 16.
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1. Noncitizen Detention Undermines the State’s Criminal Justice
Reform Efforts
The recent influx of 8,000 ICE detainees to Louisiana is contrary to
public policy because it undermines the state’s efforts to reduce its prison
population.197 Governor Edwards enacted criminal justice reform in 2017
with strong bipartisan support, and his reelection in 2019, in the face of
criticism by his opponents for being soft on crime, is evidence of popular
support for his agenda on criminal justice reform.198 The main objective of
criminal justice reform legislation in Louisiana was to reduce the state’s
incarceration rate.199 Further, the legislation mandates that the government
reinvest savings from the program to reduce recidivism so as to further
reduce the prison population.200 The expansion of ICE detainees in the
state is an unintended consequence of the state’s successful criminal
justice reform.201 This expansion can be attributed at least in part to the
practice of “forum shopping,” which is specifically designed to deny
noncitizens due process by moving them to a location where they are likely
to lose their case.202 Louisiana should not support federal immigration
policies which are intended to subvert basic human rights.203 Having the
second largest population of ICE detainees undermines Louisiana’s
primary objective of shedding its status as the state with the largest rate of
incarceration overall.204 This second place status is not a distinction that
Louisiana should embrace.205
2. ICE Detention Is Not A Sustainable Economic Plan
The Louisiana Legislature should also consider the effects of ICE
detentions on the state’s economy. The sudden movement of 8,000
detained people to the state will have large effects on local infrastructure—
including medical, legal, transportation, and economic systems—in ways
197. Id.
198. Daniel Strauss, Louisiana election shows limits of ‘old tough-on-crime
Stuff,’ POLITICO (Nov. 24, 2019, 6:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019
/11/24/john-bel-edwards-criminal-justice-reform-louisiana-072952 [https://perm
a.cc/66JC-GY7D].
199. Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 13.
200. Id.
201. Merchant, supra note 16.
202. See generally Pon, supra note 137.
203. See supra Part III.C.
204. See supra Part III.C.
205. See supra Part III.C.
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that are not yet apparent.206 Louisiana parishes have been eager to enter
ICE contracts because they generate revenue for local communities.207
This windfall is particularly enticing for local parishes that lost state
revenue when the governor’s criminal justice reform legislation decreased
the need for prison space.208 One Winn Parish sheriff compared the local
prison closing with an automobile plant closing in terms of its potential
impact on local jobs.209 This reality raises questions as to whether prisons
are the best industry to sustain local Louisiana communities.210 If ICE
loses its need to detain people here—which is possible given the recent
federal policy change that requires people to stay in Mexico while they
await a decision on their asylum application—then local parishes could
lose funding for their prisons again.211 The legislature should come up with
a more sustainable means for addressing the economic pressure that local
parishes face as a result of lost revenue from state prisoners.212
Specifically, the state can work with local parishes to reinvest the money
currently generated by ICE contracts into sustainable and productive
endeavors such as education, healthcare, and career development
programs.213
3. Human Rights Concerns
Finally, current ICE detention practices raise concerns over human
rights.214 The federal government is currently detaining noncitizens in
206. For a discussion of challenges to local governments associated with
immigration detention, see Adams, supra note 15.
207. Merchant, supra note 16.
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Winnfield Sheriff Cranford Jordan as saying, “It would be
devastating . . . . You’d see people moving, bankruptcy. It would be like an
automobile plant closing”).
210. Id.
211. See generally Jason Kao & Denise Lu, How Trump’s Policies Are
Leaving Thousands of Asylum Seekers Waiting in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/18/us/mexico-immigration
-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/K5GS-D6KE].
212. Merchant, supra note 16.
213. For a more detailed description of this proposal, see CHICAGO
COMMUNITY BOND FUND, MONEY FOR COMMUNITIES, NOT CAGES: THE CASE
FOR REDUCING THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S JAIL BUDGET (Oct. 2018), https://
chicagobond.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/money-for-communities-not-cage
s-why-cook-county-should-reduce-the-sheriffs-bloated-jail-budget.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/MT3Y-XFUQ].
214. See UNHRC Revised Guidelines, supra note 11.
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unprecedented numbers.215 There are backlogs in immigration courts,
coupled with federal government policies denying parole and bond, which
has led to long-term detentions for many noncitizens.216 On average, the
federal government detains these noncitizens for six months to a year,
though it detains many for several years.217 Ultimately, many of the
detainees are successful in their claims and therefore stay in the country.218
This reality calls into question the rationale for prolonged detention of
noncitizens.219 The government’s current detention policies have resulted
in a system in which people like Hernández Diáz, who came to the United
States seeking asylum from Cuba, are treated like criminals, languishing
in prison while they await a court date.220 Hernández Diáz came to the
United States in an attempt to escape persecution in his home country and
killed himself while he awaited his asylum hearing in prison in the United
States.221 The U.N. recommends against detention of noncitizens precisely
because people like Hernández Diáz are too vulnerable to sustain the stress
of incarceration.222
Supporters of current ICE detention practices argue that the
government should detain noncitizens while vetting them for admissibility
into the United States to ensure the safety of the community.223
Immigration officials already consider two factors to determine bond
eligibility, specifically, risk of flight and danger to the community.224 The
fact that the government increasingly denies bond or parole to detained
noncitizens without consideration of these factors suggests that the
215. Merchant, supra note 16. For the deterrence and punishment rationales
for prolonged detention of immigrants, see supra Part I.D.
216. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 861 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
217. Id at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. Armus, supra note 1.
221. Id.
222. See UNHRC Revised Guidelines, supra note 11.
223. See REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM
(2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/YXJ7-XBP8] (suggesting that security considerations should be of primary
concern to the government when it considers whether to admit refugees and
asylees).
224. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8) (2020). This regulatory
standard also applies to custody determinations by immigration judges at bond
hearings. See Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1112 (BIA 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684
(D. Mass. 2018).
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security rationale is not its primary concern.225 To the contrary, the federal
government’s rhetoric and policy objectives make clear that the real
objective in detaining noncitizens for prolonged periods of time is to
punish and deter them.226 Given the due process issues with this approach,
the need to prevent current ICE detention practices is clear.227
IV. A NECESSARY SOLUTION: GIVE THE POWER TO CONTRACT TO THE
STATE
Louisiana has an interest in being the primary decisionmaker when it
comes to ICE detention contracts in the state because its citizens will
ultimately feel the impact of this influx of ICE detainees.228 Under the
current system, ICE effectively cuts the state out of the decision-making
process by contracting directly with local parishes.229 This setup
circumvents the political process and prevents the state from looking
holistically at the problems with ICE detention practices to decide whether
it is a system worth supporting.230 Louisiana is not the first state to grapple
with an influx of ICE detention contracts and with questions of what to do
about them.231 For reasons similar to those Louisiana faces, other states
have implemented options for ending ICE detention contracts.232 For
example, California, which has a population of 4,000 detainees, enacted
legislation in October 2019 to prevent localities from contracting with ICE
for the purpose of detaining noncitizens.233 This legislation prevents
localities from entering into future contracts with ICE or extending
existing contracts.234 It grants the state the authority to determine whether
to enter into agreements with ICE.235 The state would then have the ability
to negotiate with the federal government to address its concerns and refuse
to continue contracting with ICE if those concerns go unaddressed.236
225. See generally Korthuis, supra note 20.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra Part III.C.
229. See supra Part III.C.
230. See supra Part III.C.
231. Adams, supra note 15.
232. Id.
233. Michigan and Illinois also adopted similar legislation. Id.
234. Note that because the California legislation is so new, it is relatively
untested; however, its objectives are the same as those discussed here. See S.B.
94, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (adding Section 1670.9 of the California
Civil Code).
235. See supra Part III.C.
236. See supra Part III.C.
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A. Legislative Proposal
The Louisiana legislature should adopt a modified version of
California’s Senate Bill No. 94, adding the new legislation to the Louisiana
Revised Statutes, Title 15, Criminal Procedure.237
Specifically, the legislature should add a new section R.S. 15:1615,
regarding contracts for civil immigration detention:
(i) A city, parish, city and parish, or local law enforcement agency
that does not, as of [date], have a contract with the federal
government or any federal agency or a private corporation to
house or detain noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration
custody, shall not, on and after [date], enter into a contract with
the federal government or any federal agency or a private
corporation, to house or detain in a locked detention facility
noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody.
(ii) A city, parish, city and parish, or local law enforcement agency
that, as of [date], has an existing contract with the federal
government or any federal agency or a private corporation to
detain noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody, shall
not, on and after [date], renew or modify that contract in a manner
that would expand the maximum number of contract beds that
may be utilized to house or detain in a locked detention facility
noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody.
Paragraph (i) prevents cities and parishes from entering into new
contracts with ICE to detain noncitizens. Further, paragraph (ii) prevents
them from extending existing contracts. Principles of contract law would
prevent the state from ending contracts already in existence; however, this
proposed legislative solution would effectively end ICE contracts with
Louisiana parishes when current contracts expire, which would be within
five years in most cases.238
B. Policy Objectives
The intent of this legislative proposal is to shift the power to contract
with ICE from local parishes to the state.239 The legislation would prevent
localities from entering into any new contracts with ICE or extending
237. S.B. 94, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
238. Clark, supra note 3.
239. See supra Part III.C.
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existing contracts.240 It would not preclude the state from entering into
contracts with the federal government to house noncitizens; instead, the
legislation simply transfers the decision-making authority from local
subdivisions to the state.241 This concentration of power in one single
entity gives the state bargaining power to work with the federal
government to address concerns with federal immigration policies.242 The
legislation would also provide the state with the opportunity to stop
contracting with the federal government if its concerns go unaddressed.243
Notably, this legislation would not impact all ICE contracts with
localities, just contracts to detain noncitizens.244 The proposed statute
would not affect other federal-state partnerships, such as cooperative
arrangements between federal and local law enforcement agencies for the
purposes of immigration enforcement.245 Nor does it preclude the
possibility that the state will choose to continue to contract with ICE for
the purposes of detention, should the federal government improve upon its
current detention practices to the state’s satisfaction.246 It simply places the
decision-making authority into the hands of the state rather than local
parishes.247
C. Expected Results
Enactment of this proposed legislation affords Louisiana the
opportunity to reject its current role as the state with the second largest
population of ICE detainees.248 Ideally, this action will force federal
policymakers to reckon with the due process issues associated with current
ICE detention practices and will lead to positive change.249 Even if the
federal government is not inspired to change its policies and chooses to go
elsewhere to house its detainees, the legislation will be effective to the
extent that it will remove Louisiana from the equation.250 The legislation
also leaves open the possibility that Louisiana will continue to house ICE

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
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detainees should the federal policy change for the better.251 This
arrangement gives the state greater bargaining power in its interactions
with the federal government.252
Localities may oppose the legislation on the grounds that ICE
detention contracts are a source of revenue for them.253 Although it is true
that under the Home Rule Doctrine, Louisiana gives great deference to
localities in decisions about how to govern themselves, the Doctrine would
not apply in this case.254 The Home Rule Charter in the Louisiana
Constitution explicitly states that it is “[s]ubject to and not inconsistent
with [the Louisiana] constitution.”255 Furthermore, both state and local
officials are beholden to the same citizenry such that a state legislature
decision to end ICE detention contracts would necessarily include input
from the affected localities.256
For the same reasons that ICE detention practices are problematic
under the U.S. Constitution, they are problematic under the Louisiana
Constitution.257 The Louisiana Constitution provides the same due process
protections to persons as the U.S. Constitution.258 Therefore, housing ICE
detainees is unconstitutional under the state constitution for the same
reasons that it is unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.259 ICE
detention practices are therefore inconsistent with the Louisiana
Constitution, and the Home Rule Charter does not apply to this
proposal.260
Additionally, Louisiana private prison companies that benefit from
their ability to contract with ICE may oppose this new legislation.261 The
proposed language precludes localities from entering into ICE contracts
on behalf private prison companies; however, it does not stop ICE from

251. See supra Part III.B.
252. See supra Part III.B.
253. See supra Part III.C.
254. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“Home Rule Charter”); see also LA. REV.
STAT. § 33:106 (2018).
255. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (emphasis added).
256. See supra Part III.C.
257. See LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 13.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Will DuPress, Williamson County agreement with ICE detention
center ends Thursday, NBC-KXAN (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.kxan.com/
news/local/williamson-county/williamson-county-agreement-with-ice-detentioncenter-ends-thursday/ [https://perma.cc/RL8D-3RMS].
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contracting with private prison companies directly.262 Even though the
legislative proposal would not prevent private entities from entering into
these contracts, the state has some bargaining power with private
contractors.263 The same private contractors that house ICE detainees
maintain contracts with the state to house state prisoners.264 Therefore,
private prison companies have incentives to maintain good relationships
with the state and are likely be amenable to discussions with state officials
about concerns with ICE detention contracts.265
This legislative proposal will shift the power to contract with the
federal government to house ICE detainees from local parishes to the
state.266 This shift consolidates power within the state and provides greater
opportunity for the state to negotiate with the federal government over
policies it opposes, with the ability to stop cooperating if the federal
government fails to address those concerns.267 It does not preclude the state
from entering into future contracts with ICE for purposes other than
detention.268 Nor does it prevent the state from contracting with ICE to
detain noncitizens in the future should federal government policies
improve.269 It simply places the state in a stronger bargaining position to
have its concerns addressed.270 With this legislation, the state will have the
ability to advocate for improved federal immigration policies that protect
noncitizens’ constitutional rights, such as a policy to release asylum
seekers on parole or bond while they await a final decision on their asylum
application.271
CONCLUSION
The decision to detain noncitizens in Louisiana is a policy one that
should be made at the state level, not on an ad hoc basis through contracts

262. Problems arose with a proposal in Williamson County, Texas. The local
government there chose to end its contract with a private prison company to house
ICE detainees following reports of abuse and neglect at the facility; however, the
facility contracted with ICE and was able to continue operations. See id.
263. Clark, supra note 3.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See supra Part III.C.
267. See supra Part III.C.
268. See supra Part III.C.
269. See supra Part III.C.
270. See supra Part III.C.
271. See supra Part III.C.
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between the federal government and local parishes.272 Because ICE
detention practices are unconstitutional on due process grounds, the state
legislature should enact a law to prevent local parishes from entering into
future agreements with ICE to detain noncitizens or from renewing
existing contracts.273 This Comment’s proposed legislative solution will
achieve that goal.274 The legislation will move decision-making authority
about ICE detention contracts to the state government, giving the state the
ability to negotiate with the federal government about policies it does not
support and to choose not to participate if those concerns are not
addressed.275

272.
273.
274.
275.
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